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Abstract—Increasing connectivity of communication networks
enables large-scale distributed processing over networks and im-
proves the efficiency for information exchange. However, malware
and virus can take advantage of the high connectivity to spread
over the network and take control of devices and servers for
illicit purposes. In this paper, we use an SIS epidemic model to
capture the virus spreading process and develop a virus-resistant
weight adaptation scheme to mitigate the spreading over the
network. We propose a differential game framework to provide
a theoretic underpinning for decentralized mitigation in which
nodes of the network cannot fully coordinate, and each node
determines its own control policy based on local interactions with
neighboring nodes. We characterize and examine the structure
of the Nash equilibrium, and discuss the inefficiency of the
Nash equilibrium in terms of minimizing the total cost of the
whole network. A mechanism design through a penalty scheme
is proposed to reduce the inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium
and allow the decentralized policy to achieve social welfare for
the whole network. We corroborate our results using numerical
experiments and show that virus-resistance can be achieved by
a distributed weight adaptation scheme.
Index Terms—Virus Resistance, Malware Spreading, Differen-
tial Game, Complex Networks, Decentralized Control, Mecha-
nism Design, Network Security, Epidemic Processes.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE integration of the information and communicationstechnologies into systems upgrades system performance.
However, the integration also degrades the security level of
the systems and introduces vulnerabilities that undermine
the reliability of critical infrastructure. The connectivity and
interdependence of cyber networks make the system even
more vulnerable due to the existence of the wide-spreading
cyber-attacks on networks. It provides opportunities for the
sophisticated and stealthy malware and virus to spread over the
network. One noteworthy example is the StuxNet attack [1].
In June 2010, certain control systems of a nuclear-enrichment
plant in Iran were infected by a carefully crafted computer
worm called StuxNet. The worm, spreading through USB
devices, intended to breach the implemented cyberprotection
schemes and alter both the measurement and actuation signals
which caused instabilities and damage the physical plant [2].
More recent examples of wide-spreading cyber-attacks include
WannaCry and Petya Ransomware, which have incurred bil-
lions of dollars of losses [3].
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Fig. 1. The interactions between the spreading, topology and individual
behavior. The agents adapt their behavior of contacting other agents due to
virus spreading. The agents behavior changes the topology of the network
which will in in turn affects the spreading process. For example, after the
topology change, the virus is less likely to spread from device 1 to device 2.
With an increasing number of wide-spreading cyber-attacks
on networks, protection against malware and virus spreading
in cyber networks is central to the security of network systems
[3]. However, there are many challenges on designing a
protection scheme for cyber networks. One challenge is due
to the interderdependency between the microscopic individual
behaviors and the macroscopic spreading phenomenon. The
local interactions over a large network where nodes commu-
nicate, share information, and make interdependent decisions,
can result in a macroscopic behavior, which will in turn
affect the agents’ behaviors. This type of microscopic and
macroscopic couplings has been illustrated in Fig. 1. Another
challenge arises from the fact that cyber networks are often
formed by a large number of self-interested agents or decision-
makers. The noncooperation among the agents makes it almost
impossible for the system to be coordinated as a whole to
defend against wide-spreading cyber-attacks.
To this end, one way to mitigate the malware spreading over
large networks is to control the intensity of interactions with
neighboring nodes. By adapting the rate of communications
or contacts, nodes can reduce the likelihood of infection. This
type of mechanism is called weight adaptation as the weights
between two nodes of a network capture the intensity of the
connectivity [4]. The most fundamental reason that virus and
malware can go viral is the inherent property of networks:
connectivity. Weight adaptation is a mechanism that hits the
nail. Weight adaptation lowers the connectivity which leaves
2virus and malware no way out. Compared with quarantining
and link removal [5], weight adaptation does not need to
completely disconnect nodes from others but rather adjust
weights to connect more loosely with nodes with a higher
likelihood of infection. Instead of fixing the weights for the
whole spreading process, in the weight adapation scheme,
each agent dynamically updates their weight in response to
the state of the neighboring nodes. Weight adaptation is
different from changing the infection rate. The infection rate
is usually considered to be decided by some interior factors
like physiological or immunological states of individual. The
weight between two nodes is usually used to describe how
strongly two nodes are connected. Changing the weight can
be interpreted as an exterior change.
We consider a directed weighted network where the nodes
and the edges represent the agents and the connections be-
tween the agents respectively. The directed connection be-
tween two nodes can be considered as one agent acquiring
information/data/packet from another agent. The weight be-
tween two agents quantifies the frequency or the volume of
communication between two agents [6]. The original weight
is pre-designed by multilateral agreement among agents to
achieve certain goals or to optimize the system performance
when there is no infection. For example, in distributed esti-
mation or learning problems over networks such as [6]–[8],
one agent needs to communicate with its neighboring agents
at a sufficient rate to find the global estimate of the state.
The optimal weighting on the edges quantitatively captures
the minimum required frequency of contacting neighboring
nodes. As illustrated in Fig. 2, when there are wide-spreading
virus or cyber attacks, the agent can decrease the likelihood
of being infected by reducing their weight with infected
neighbors. The agent then restores the connections when the
infected neighbors are recovered. Deviation of the weights
from the optimal ones introduces cost induced by performance
degradation and system inefficiency. Infected agents may not
function normally. The agents and the network system will
suffer losses. Thus, it is essential to consider the trade-off
between malfunction cost caused by infection and inefficiency
or performance degradation cost caused by weight deviation.
In this paper, an N-person nonzero-sum differential game-
based model is proposed to model the virus spreading and the
agents’ adaptive response to virus infection. This model cap-
tures the non-cooperative behaviors among agents, dynamic
properties of spreading process, and the complexity of the
local interactions. We characterize the Nash equilibrium (NE)
for the game and investigate the network effects under the
non-cooperative strategies. We observe that under the open-
loop NE, each agent updates his weight based on its own
infection level and its out-neighbors infection level as well as
the corresponding component of its costate. When the agent’s
own infection level is high, it does not care much about
the weight of links to infected out-neighbors. When its out-
neighbor’s infection level is high, it lowers more weight of the
corresponding connection. The corresponding component of
each agent’s costate encodes the information about the network
structure and the infection of the whole network.
We use a centralized optimal control problem to serve as a
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Fig. 2. Weight adaptation scheme to mitigate the infection for the node in
the center over an undirected network. The line width indicates the weight.
Red nodes are the infected ones while blue nodes are the susceptible ones.
The susceptible node decreases the weight of its connection to an infected
node. Once the infected node is recovered, the weight of the connection to
the recovered node will be restored as it is shown by process c to d. The
purple link and the green link are the ones who adapt the weights.
benchmark problem to study the efficiency of the decentral-
ized problem. Under centralized policies, the system operator
develops optimal weight adaptation scheme to achieve social
optimum. Compared with the centralized solution, the open-
loop NE solution is not the best from a system point of
view since in the game, agents consider only their own cost.
Such inefficiency caused by selfish behavior of agents has a
significant impact on network and service management. One
example is the congestion in traffic network caused by selfish
drivers [9]. To address the inefficiency, we propose a dynamic
penalty approach by designing a mechanism in which each
agent pays for the infection cost of all agents that are reachable
to him/her. We show that with this mechanism, the open-loop
NE policy achieves the social optimum.
The equilibrium analysis and the mechanism design lead
to a distributed algorithm for the network operator and the
agents to compute the optimal weight adaptation where each
agent only has to know local information. We summarize the
principal contributions as follows:
1) We propose a differential game model to develop a virus-
resistant weight adaptation scheme for cyber networks
formed by a group of self-interested agents.
2) We study the structure of the open-loop NE for the
differential game over complex networks and show the
weight adaptation rule is based on the agents’ and its
out-neighbors’ infection level as well as the costate.
3) We discuss the inefficiency of the NE. A dynamic
penalty scheme is proposed to achieve social optimum
for the whole network.
4) An implementable distributed virus resistance algorithm
is proposed to compute the NE-based control policy.
Game theory has long been a useful tool to design strategies
on network systems for virus resistance purposes [3], [10]–
[12]. In [10], the authors have proposed a network formation
game that balances multiple partially conflicting objectives
such as the cost of installing links, the performance of the
3network and the resistance to virus. In their work, an undi-
rected unweighted static network is formed. Hayel et.al. in [3],
[11] have studied large population game with heterogeneous
types of individuals. They focus on group behavior of certain
type in stead of individual behavior. Besides game theory,
other tools such as impulse control [13], optimal control [14],
and optimization [15] have been used to design strategies to
mitigate malware attacks and virus spreading.
Virus spreading over adaptive networks has first been stud-
ied by Gross et.al. in [16]. They investigated adaptive behavior
in a homogeneous way where the whole network takes the
same adaption. Based on the work on epidemic spreading over
time-varying networks [17], optimal control method has been
utilized to find the optimal time-varying topology response for
the network system in [14]. However, the centralized optimal
control method is not practical and lack of incentive. The effect
of heterogeneous weight adaptation on virus spreading has
been studied by Yun et al. in [18], [19]. In [18], the authors
have proposed a weight adaptation rule without taking cost
into consideration. The weight adaptation rule is based on the
infection level of the whole network.
Vaccination and immunity have been studying for control of
virus spreading over decades [13], [15], [20]. But vaccination
may not be efficient for some malware and virus due to
their fast upgrading and undetectability. Also, getting every
individual vaccinated is costly. Quarantining [5] is equivalent
to removal of all connections of one agent. Compared with
weight adaptation scheme, it is overreacting to disconnect all
links since connection with healthy agents cause no harm.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. II, preliminaries
are given and the N-person nonzero-sum differential game
framework is introduced. Section III describes the open-loop
NE of the differential game and the weight adaptation scheme.
Sect. IV studies the efficiency of the NE solution. Comparisons
of the differential game-based weight adaptation scheme with
the optimal control based scheme and other numerical results
are given in Sect. V. Conclusions are contained in Sect. VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we introduce notations and preliminary
results needed in our derivations. Along the way, we describe
and develop the problem formulation.
A. Graph Theory
A weighted, directed graph can be defined by a triple G ,
(V ,E ,W ). V , {v1,v2, ...,vN} represents a set of N nodes.
Define N , {1, ...,N}. A set of directed edges is denoted
by E ⊆ V ×V . The set of in-neighbors of node i is defined
as N ini , { j| j ∈ V ,( j, i) ∈ E }. Denote by | · | the cardinality
of a set. So, the in-degree of vi is |N
in
i |. Similarly, the set
of out-neighbors of vi is N
out
i , { j| j ∈ V ,(i, j) ∈ E }. The
out-degree of vi is |N
out
i |. The weight adjacency matrix G is
denoted by an N×N matrix W , [wi j] where wi j refers to the
weight of the edge from node i to j. We assume that graph G
has no self-loops.
We denote the original weight adjacency matrix by W o =
[woi j] ∈R
N×N . Let N outi,o (N
in
i,o ) be the set of out-neighbors (in-
neighbors) under the original optimal weight pattern W o.
B. Virus Spreading Model
With the fact that cyber network nodes do not have human-
like autoantibody/vaccination which can prevent individual
from being infected again, we study the so-called susceptible-
infected-susceptible (SIS) models. Consider a population of N
agents. Each agent can be either susceptible (S) or infected (I).
Infected individuals infect others at rate βi ≥ 0. The intensity
of interaction between vi and v j is described by the weight
wi j ∈R. Denote wi = (wi1, ...,wiN)
′ ∈RN . We assume that the
weight is bounded by w¯i j ∈ R. If vi ∈ V is susceptible while
v j ∈ V is infected, there is possibility that vi will be infected
after the interaction. In addition, each infected agent returns to
the susceptible state at some rate σi. The state of a node i at
time t ≥ 0 is a binary random variable Xi(t) ∈ {0,1}, with
Xi(t) = 0 (Xi(t) = 1), indicating that agent i is susceptible
(infected). The state vector of all N agents is denoted by
X(t) = (X1(t),X2(t), ...,XN(t))
′ ∈ {0,1}N. With the adaptive
weight wi j(t) from agent i to j, the stochastic state transitions
of node vi from time t to t+∆t can be written as follows:
P(Xi(t+∆t) = 1|Xi(t) = 0,X(t))
=
N
∑
j=1
wi jβ jX j(t)∆t+ o(∆t),
P(Xi(t+∆t) = 0|Xi(t) = 1,X(t)) = σi∆t+ o(∆t).
(1)
The model (1) is computationally challenging under large-
scale networks due to the exponentially increasing state space.
Hence, we resort to mean-field approximation of the Markov
process [17], [21], [22]. Denote xi(t)∈ [0,1] as the probability
of agent i being infected at time t. The mean-field approxima-
tion then provides
x˙i(t) = (1− xi(t))
N
∑
j=1
wi j(t)β jx j(t)−σixi(t), (2)
for i = 1,2, ...,N. To write this dynamics equation in a more
compact form, denote x(t) = (x1(t), ...,xN(t))
′. We have
x˙(t) = G(x(t),W(t)), (3)
where G(·, ·) : RN × RN×N → RN which can be written
as G(x(t),W(t)) = (W (t)B−D)x(t)−Xd(t)W (t)Bx(t) where
W (t) = [wi j(t)]N×N , B= diag(β1, ...,βN), D= diag(σ1, ...,σ2),
and Xd(t) = diag(x1(t), ...,xN(t)).
According to the discussion in [17], the n-intertwined model
(2) gives an upper-bound for the exact probability of infection,
xi(t). However, the mean-field approximation consider herein,
while it is an approximation, is well constructed because the
scale of networks, i.e., N in our model is large and we focus
on the cases where β/σ is above the threshold [22].
The graph and the epidemic spreading process can be
viewed as physical constraints. The agents in the network
are coupled by these constraints while trying to minimize
their own cost. Such behaviors lead to differential games over
networks, which will be introduced in the following section.
C. Differential Game Over Networks
As we mentioned in Section I, the self-interested agents aim
to minimize their own costs. One cost arise from malfunction
4caused by infection. Another cost for agent i is to describe
inefficiency or degradation of system performance caused by
deviation from the original weight woi j for all j ∈ N . We
consider the original weight as an optimal weight under which
the agent can achieve the most benefit.
For agent i, the infection cost function, given by fi :
[0,1]→R+, is a function of xi(t) ∈ [0,1]. fi is assumed to be
monotonically increasing to capture the loss of being infected.
A weight cost function for edge from i to j is given by
gi j(wi j(t)−w
o
i j) where gi j : R→ R
+ is convex. The function
satisfies gi j(w) = 0 at and only at w = 0 for all i, j ∈ N
because the original weight is optimal to the agent when there
is no infection. It is optimal in terms of the tradeoff between
price and performance. The marginal cost of deviation from
the optimal weight will increase as the distance from the
adapted weight to the optimal weight increases. Considering
a time duration from 0 to T ≥ 0, the cost function of agent i
during time interval [0,T ] is given as follows by
Ji =
T∫
0
fi(xi(t))+
N
∑
j=1
gi j(wi j(t)−w
o
i j)dt. (4)
As each node determines its own weight adaptation policy,
it naturally leads to a differential game framework defined as
follows. Consider N agents in the network as N players with
an index set N = {1, ...,N}. The duration of the evolution
of the game is given by the time interval [0,T ]. Denote
x(t) = (x1(t), ...,xN(t))
′. Let X = {x∈RN |xi ∈ [0,1],∀i∈N }
be the permissible set of the states. For each fixed t ∈ [0,T ],
x(t) ∈X . Let wi(t) = (wi1, ...,wiN) be the controls of player
i. The admissible control set for player i is Si = {0 ≤ wi j ≤
w¯i j,∀ j ∈ N }, i.e., for each fixed t ∈ [0,T ], wi ∈ Si ⊂ R
N . A
differential equation is given by (2) whose solution describes
the state trajectory of the game corresponding to the N-tuple
of control functions {wi(t),0 ≤ t ≤ T, i ∈ N} and the given
initial state x0 , (x1(0), ...,xN(0))
′ = (x10, ...,xN0)
′. Define a
set-valued function ηi(·) for each i ∈ N to characterize the
information pattern of player i. We consider the open-loop
pattern in our case where ηi(t) = {x0}, t ∈ [0,T ]. We can state
our problem as the following differential game problem:
min
wi∈Si
Ji(wi)
s.t. (2),
(5)
where Ji(·) : R
N → R and xi(0) = xi0, i = 1,2, ...,N. Each
player aims to find a control policy µi(t,xi0) to generate a
weight trajectory wi(t). Such control policies are open-loop
ones that depend on the initial condition of the individual state.
Remark 1. The game defined by (5) is a differential game
over networks where the cost only depends on their own state
and controls. Nodes interact with their neighbors. The network
topology is captured by wi j, i ∈N , j ∈ N . The time-varying
property of the network is described by wi j(t) for t ∈ [0,T ].
Remark 2. Information structure determines the state infor-
mation gained and recalled by players at time t. The reasons
why we adopt open-loop policies are three-fold. First, the
obtained open-loop policy can be implemented as a feedback
policy [23] as is shown in Section III. Since the dynamics (3)
is determined, the state at any time can be computed and used
to determine the control policy. Second, to obtain a strongly
time-consistent optimal and individual feedback policies, we
have to resort to techniques of dynamic programming. How-
ever, a direct application of dynamic programming will not
yield an individual feedback policy. Also, computation of the
feedback control law derived from Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman
equation requires solving nonlinear PDEs which increases the
difficulty of distributed implementation. Third, obtaining open-
loop policy resorts to maximum principle which well presents
the structure of the optimal solution. This helps us to analyze
the inefficiency of the NE and obtain a penalty function to
achieve social optimum as is shown in Section IV.
III. ANALYTIC RESULTS
The solutions to the N-person non-cooperative nonzero-sum
differential game (5) played with an open-loop information
structure are open-loop Nash equilibria.
Definition 1. The weight adaptation trajectories or say the
control trajectories {w∗i , i ∈N } constitute an open-loop NE
solution of the differential game (5) if the inequalities
J1(w
∗
1,w
∗
2, ...,w
∗
N)≤ J1(w1,w
∗
2, ...,w
∗
N)
J2(w
∗
1,w
∗
2, ...,w
∗
N)≤ J2(w
∗
1,w2, ...,w
∗
N)
...
JN(w
∗
1,w
∗
2, ...,w
∗
N)≤ JN(w
∗
1,w
∗
2, ...,wN)
(6)
hold for all control trajectories wi(t)∈ Si, t ∈ [0,T ]. We denote
x∗i (t), t ∈ [0,T ] the associated state trajectory for i ∈N .
The definition states that at open-loop NE, no agents have
incentive to deviate unilaterally away from the optimal trajec-
tory from time 0 to time T .
To obtain the necessary conditions for the open-loop NE,
we make two mild assumptions.
Assumption 1. For each i ∈ N , the infection cost function
fi(·) is to be of C
1 class.
Assumption 2. For each i, j ∈ N , the weight deviation cost
function gi j(·) is to be of C
1 class.
Each player i ∈ N can decide to receive data or packets
from any other agent. The following observation narrows down
the set of possible solutions of the open-loop NE.
Observation 1. If {u∗i j(t), i ∈N , j ∈ N
out
i,o } is an open-loop
NE solution for the following differential game
min
ui∈Ui
Ji =
T∫
0
fi(xi(t))+ ∑
j∈N outi,o
gi j(ui j(t)−w
o
i j)dt
s.t. x˙i(t) = (1− xi(t)) ∑
j∈N outi,o
ui j(t)β jx j(t)−σixi(t),
xi(0) = xi0, i= 1,2, ...,N,
(7)
5with ui j(t) ∈ [0,w
o
i j] for i ∈ N , j ∈ N
out
i,o , t ∈ [0,T ], and
{w∗i j(t), i ∈ N , j ∈ N } is an open-loop NE solution for the
differential game defined by (5), then we have
w∗i j(t) =
{
u∗i j(t) if j ∈N
out
i,o
0 otherwise
(8)
for all player i and for each t ∈ [0,T ].
Proof: See Appendix B-A.
Observation 1 simplifies the searching process for the open-
loop NE. Instead of analyzing problem (5), we can focus on
problem (7) which contains a smaller admissible control set.
Define ui = {ui j, j ∈ N
out
i,o }. To be specific, the admissible
control set of game problem (7) for player i is Ui = {0 ≤
ui j(t) ≤ w
o
i j, j ∈ N
out
i,o , t ∈ [0,T ]}. From Theorem 5.1 of [23]
and Lemma 1, the differential equation in (7) admits a unique
solution if the weight adaptation control is continuous in t.
Next, we discuss the derivation of candidate NE solutions
for differential game (7) when the information structure of
the game is open-loop pattern. Utilizing techniques in optimal
control theory, we arrive at the following result.
Theorem 1. For the N-person differential game (7), we have
assumptions 1 and 2. Then, if {u∗i (t), i ∈ N } is an open-
loop NE solution, and {x∗(t),0≤ t ≤ T} is the corresponding
state trajectory, there exist N costate functions pi(·) : [0,T ]→
R
N , i ∈ N , whose j-th component is denoted by pi j(·), such
that the following relations are satisfied:
x˙∗i (t) = (1− x
∗
i ) ∑
j∈N outi,o
u∗i j(t)β jx
∗
j −σix
∗
i (t),
x∗i (0) = xi0, ∀i ∈N ,
(9)
u∗i (t) = arg min
ui∈Ui
Hi(t,pi(t),x
∗,u∗1(t), ...,u
∗
i−1,ui,u
∗
i+1(t), ...,u
∗
N(t)),
(10)
p˙i(t) = Γi(t,x
∗,u∗1, ...,u
∗
N)pi(t)+ γi(t), pi(T ) = 0, (11)
where
Hi(t,pi,x,u1, ...,uN), fi(xi(t))+ ∑
j∈N outi,o
gi j(ui j−w
o
i j)
+
N
∑
j=1
pi j

(1− x j) ∑
k∈N outj,o
u jkβkxk(t)+σ jx j(t)

 ,
(12)
and Γi is a matrix given by
Γi,mn =


∑
j∈N outm,o
u∗mj(t)β jx
∗
j(t)+σm if n= m
−(1− x∗n(t))u
∗
nm(t)βm if n ∈N
in
m,o
0 otherwise,
(13)
γi is a vector whose i-th component is −d fi/dxi and other
components are zero, for i ∈N .
Proof: See Appendix B-B.
Note that Γi turns out to be the same for different i. In later
discussion, we shall omit the idex i. Now, the dynamics of the
costate function can be given as p˙i(t) = Γ(t)pi(t)+ γi(t) for
i ∈ N which sheds some light on the design for achieving
social welfare in the following section. Γ(t) is a L-matrix
[24] for every t ∈ [0,T ] where the diagonal entries of Γ(t) are
positive and all off-diagonal entries are non-positive. Therefore
Γ(t) is structurally in line with the graph Laplacian whose
diagonal entries are the out-degrees of the N agents [25]. That
is for every zero or negative entry of the matrix Γ(t), the
corresponding entry of the graph Laplacian is zero or negative
respectively and vice versa. If the original graph is a directed
acyclic graph, Γ(t) is a lower triangular matrix given the index
of a proper permutation. Other than the topology information,
Γ(t) also contains the infection information. Note that even
though we write the dynamics of the costates in an affine
form, it is actually not affine which is because Γ(t) depends
on x∗(t) and u∗i j, i ∈ N , j ∈N as we can see from (13) and
u∗i j is dependent on pii as we will show next in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Define φi j(t) := pii(t)(1− x
∗
i (t))β jx
∗
j(t) where
pii(·) is the ith component of the costate function pi(·). The
basic structure of the NE-based optimal weight control, i.e.,
the solution to (10), can be written as:
u∗i j(t) =

0, −φi j(t)≤ g
′
i j(−w
o
i j),
(g′i j)
−1(−φi j(t)), g
′
i j(−w
o
i j)<−φi j(t)< g
′
i j(0),
woi j, −φi j(t)≥ g
′
i j(0),
(14)
for i ∈N , j ∈N outi,o .
Proof: See Appendix B-C.
Condition (10) in Theorem 1 can thus be replaced by (14).
Theorem 1 together with (14) provides a weight adaptation
scheme where each agent adapts its weight to minimize the
possibility of being infected and the loss of efficiency/interest.
The weight of the edge from player i to player j, controlled
by player i, is based on the costate component pii(t), player i’s
own infection xi(t) and its out-neighbors infection. Apparently,
the higher the infection level of agent j is, the lower the weight
of edge (i, j) should be. As is shown in (11) and (13), pii(t)
is highly coupled and it contains information about the effect
of the whole network.
Remark 3. Based on the structure of the optimal control (14),
the dynamics of costates (11) as well as Lemma 1, we can
infer that the NE-based optimal control trajectory u∗i j(t) is
continuous for every i ∈ N , j ∈ N which means there is no
switching in the optimal weight adaptation.
Remark 4. From (14), we know the weight between agents
i and j may be adapted to zero at certain time as one
can see that u∗i j(t) = 0 if −φi j(t) ≤ g
′
i j(−ω
o
i j). That means
the connection between agent i and j may be disconnected
temporarily which will be restored according to Theorem
3. For agent i, if all its out-links have weight zero, i.e.,
−φi j(t)≤ g
′
i j(−ω
o
i j) for all j ∈N
out
i,o , we can view this agent
as being quarantined from infection. We say being quarantined
from infection because there might still be in-links connecting
to agent i which means here, the concept of being quarantined
is different from the concept in undirected graph. Besides,
6the weight adaptation scheme we proposed is different from
quarantining in a sense that the weight adaptation scheme
does not need to completely disconnect nodes from all other
others but rather adjust weights to connect more loosely with
particular nodes with a higher likelihood of infection.
Corollary 1. If gi j(·) is concave, i.e., the marginal cost of
deviation increases as the adapted weight becomes more far
away from the optimal weight, the optimal control policy can
be given as follows
u∗i j(t) =


0, φi j(t)≥
gi j(−w
o
i j)
woi j
,
woi j , φi j(t)<
gi j(−w
o
i j)
woi j
,
(15)
for i ∈N , j ∈N outi,o , where φi j(t) is defined in Theorem 2.
We can see that if gi j(·) is concave, the optimal control
policy switches between 0 and woi j. In this paper, we focus
our study on the case when gi j(·) is convex.
Before stepping into the numerical computation of the open-
loop NE candidates, we go into further analysis and obtain
other structural results that would be beneficial for more
insightful understanding of the weight adaptation mechanism.
Theorem 3. The costate function and the open-loop control
trajectories have the following properties:
(i) Along the open-loop NE trajectory, pi j(t) ≥ 0 holds for
all i, j ∈ N , j 6= i and all t ∈ [0,T ]. Furthermore, pii(t)
stays positive for all i ∈N and all t ∈ [0,T ).
(ii) The open-loop NE control trajectory u∗i j(t), for i∈N , j ∈
N outi,o , satisfies u
∗
i j(t) = w
o
i j at and only at t = T and for
t < T, u∗i j(t)< w
o
i j .
(iii) If |N ini,o | = 0, i.e., the in-degree of player i is zero in
the original graph, under linear infection cost function
fi(xi(t)) =αixi(t), the component pii(t) is bounded above
by αi/σi. That is, pii(t)≤ αi/σi for t ∈ [0,T ].
(iv) If |N outi,o | = 0, i.e., the out-degree of player i is zero in
the original graph, under linear infection cost function
where fi(xi(t)) = αixi(t), the costate component pii(t) is
strictly monotonically decreasing over t.
Proof: See Appendix B-D.
Theorem 3 indicates that during the time interval [0,T ), the
agents, with an incentive to lower their own costs, adapt their
weight accordingly to impede the spreading of virus. After
the prescribed alert duration [0,T ], a recovery of topology is
always on the way to meet the minimum cost. Also, from
theorem 3 (iii), we know for agent i who has no in-neighbors,
its out-link u∗i j(t) will never be 0 if αiβ j/σi ≤ g
′
i j(−w
o
i j).
This can be readily shown by φi j = pii(1− x
∗
i (t))β jx
∗
j(t) ≤
(αi/σi)(1− x
∗
i )β jx
∗
j(t)< αiβ j/σi ≤ g
′
i j(−w
o
i j).
IV. INEFFICIENCY OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
It is well known that the non-cooperative NE in nonzero-
sum games is generally inefficient [26]. There is need to
develop a mechanism to attain a higher social welfare or
lower aggregate costs through cooperation behavior [27]. The
notion of the price of anarchy has been introduced in [28]
to quantify the inefficiency. In the network, the social cost is
the aggregate costs of all players. Let u= {u1, ...,uN} where
ui(t) ∈ R
|N outi,o | be the weight control variable for the whole
network with admissible set Uo = {u : ui j(t) ∈ [0,ω
o
i j],∀i ∈
N , j ∈ N outi,o , t ∈ [0,T ]}. Denote by u
o = {uo1, ...,u
o
N} the
social optimal solution. The social optimum can be attained
by solving the optimal control problem:
min
u∈Uo
Jo =
T∫
0
N
∑
i=1
fi(xi(t))+
N
∑
i=1
∑
j∈N outi,o
gi j(ui j(t)−w
o
i j)dt
s.t. x˙i(t) = (1− xi(t)) ∑
j∈N outi,o
ui j(t)β jx j(t)−σixi(t),
xi(0) = xi0, i= 1,2, ...,N,
(16)
where Jo : R
|N out1,o | × ·· · × R|N
out
N,o | → R. An application of
maximum principle gives the following: the optimal control
uo(t) and corresponding trajectory xo(t) must satisfy the
following so-called canonical equations:
x˙oi (t) = (1− x
o
i ) ∑
j∈N outi,o
uoi j(t)β jx
o
j −σix
o
i (t),x
o
i (0) = xi0, (17)
λ˙ (t) = Γ(t,xo,uo1, ...,u
o
N)λ (t)+ γ,λ (T) = 0, (18)
uo(t) = argmin
u∈Uo
H(t,xo(t),λ (t),u(t)), (19)
for all i ∈ N , where Γ(t) is the same with the one given in
(13) for the dynamics of the costate in the differential game
problem and γ(t) = [− f ′1(x1(t)),− f
′
2(x2(t)), ...,− f
′
N(xN)]
′, the
Hamiltonian of the optimal control problem is defined as
H(t,x(t),λ (t),u(t))
=
N
∑
i=1
fi(xi(t))+
N
∑
i=1
∑
j∈N outi,o
gi j(ui j(t)−w
o
i j)
+
N
∑
i=1
λi(t)

(1− xi(t)) ∑
j∈N outi,o
ui j(t)β jx j(t)−σixi(t)

 ,
(20)
and λ (·) : [0,T ] → RN is the costate function, λi is its ith
component. The Hamiltonian of the optimal control problem
(20) is different from the individual Hamiltonian defined in
(12). But they are related. The Hamiltonian of the optimal
control problem includes the cost of all agents over the
network instead of just individual’s cost. Also, the costate λ (t)
corresponds to the state of all agents x(t). The counterpart of
λ j(t), j ∈ N in the individual Hamiltonian defined for the
game problem is pi j(t), j ∈ N . Due to the similar structure
of the Hamiltonian of the optimal control problem and the
individual Hamiltonians for the game problem, after applying
maximum principle, we obtain (17-19) that are in the same
structure with (9-11).
An optimal point can in principle be computed centrally
by network operator to achieve social optimum. However, this
will require the network operator to be omniscient and also
not all the agents have incentives to adapt their connection
weights based on the rule designed to minimize the aggregate
costs. Also, for large-scale network/system, centralized solu-
tion gives rise to computational problems and implementability
issues. So, centralized optimal control solution is impractical.
To achieve social optimum in a distributed way, a mechanism
7needs to be designed on behalf of the network operator.
The strategy for the network operator is to set penalties
ci := (ci(t), t ∈ [0,T ]) so that the cost for player i at time t is
lˆi(t,x,u), fi(xi(t))+∑ j∈N outi,o gi j(ui j(t)−w
o
i j)+ci(t). To set a
proper penalty for each player, we need to utilize the theory of
potential differential games [29] which is an extension of the
potential game concept for static games [30]. The following
is the definition of potential differential games.
Definition 2. A differential game with cost Jˆi =
∫ T
0 lˆi(t,x,u)dt
and dynamics defined by (2) is an potential differential game
if there exists a function pi : X ×U1× ·· ·×UN × [0,T ]→ R
that satisfies the following condition for every player i ∈N∫ T
0
lˆi(t,xi,x−i,ui,u−i)− lˆi(t, xˆi, xˆ−i,vi,u−i)dt
=
∫ T
0
pi(t,xi,x−i,ui,u−i)−pi(t, xˆi, xˆ−i,vi,u−i)dt,
(21)
for all ui,vi ∈Ui, where x, xˆ∈X are the corresponding states
under controls {ui,u−i} and {vi,u−i} respectively. Here, u−i
denote the collection of controls of all players except player
i, i.e., u−i = {u1, ...,ui−1,ui+1, ...,uN}.
If we can find ci(t) for every i ∈N such that relation (21)
holds for pi = ∑Ni=1 fi(xi(t))−∑
N
i=1 ∑ j∈N outi,o
gi j(ui j(t)− w
o
i j),
then the differential game is a potential game whose open-loop
NE solution is equivalent to the open-loop solution of optimal
control problem defined by (16). The following theorem gives
important insights about choosing proper penalties ci(t).
Theorem 4. Consider a differential game with penalties where
the cost of player i is given by
Jˆi =
∫ T
0
lˆi(t)dt = Ji+
∫ T
0
ci(t)dt, (22)
which is obtained by introducing a penalty term introduced to
Ji in (7), and the constraint dynamics is in accordance with
the differential game defined by (7). Let ci(t) = ∑ j 6=i f j(x j(t)).
Then, the differential game with (22) is a potential differential
game corresponding to the optimal control problem defined by
(16), and if {u∗i (t), i ∈ N } is an open-loop NE solution for
new differential game with cost (22), and {x∗(t),0≤ t ≤ T} is
the corresponding state trajectory, the relations (17) (18) and
(19) hold for u∗ and x∗ with uo replaced by {u∗i (t), i ∈ N }
and xo replaced by x∗.
Proof: See Appendix B-E.
Theorem 4 indicates that with a proper choice of the
penalties ci(t), i ∈ N , the necessary conditions for the open-
loop NE solution of the differential game is aligned with the
necessary conditions for the optimal solution of the social cost
optimal control problem. The counterpart of condition (11) for
the penalty-based differential game can be written as
p˙i(t) = Γ(t)pi(t)+ γˆi(t) (23)
where jth component of γˆi(t) is ∂ ( fi+ ci)/∂x j. In implemen-
tation, the system operator sends the penalty function to each
agent. If the open-loop NE and the social optimal solution
uniquely exist, the open-loop NE achieves the social optimum.
1 2 3 4 5
Fig. 3. A directed graph with 5 vertices to illustrate the equilibrium solution
of a 5-person differential game over the network.
Definition 3. A directed graph is strongly connected if it
contains a directed path from j to i for every pair of vertices
{(i, j) : i ∈N , j ∈N , i 6= j}.
In a directed graph, a directed path is a sequence of edges
which join a sequence of vertices, but with the restriction
that the edges all be directed in the same direction. What we
have developed so far in this section is for cases where the
original weighted network is strongly connected. If the original
network is not strongly connected, we have the following.
Definition 4. Given a graph, if there exists a directed path
from vertex j to vertex i, we say i is reachable from j. Denote
by Ri ⊆N the set of vertices that i can be reachable from.
In graph theory, a single vertex is defined to connect to itself
by a trivial path. We have i ∈ Ri. If the graph is strongly
connected, for every i ∈ N , Ri = N . Otherwise, for some
i ∈N , we have Ri ⊂N . Denote Ri,o the counterpart of Ri
for the original graph defined by (V ,E ,W o).
Corollary 2. Consider the differential game with cost func-
tions defined in (22) and dynamics given by (7) as in Theorem
4. Let ci(t) = ∑ j∈Ri,o\{i} f j(x j). Then, if {u
∗
i (t), i ∈ N } is
an open-loop NE solution for the new differential game, and
{x∗(t),0 ≤ t ≤ T} is the corresponding state trajectory, the
relations (17), (18), and (19) hold for u∗ and x∗ with uo
replaced by {u∗i (t), i ∈N } and x
o replaced by x∗.
Proof. The proof of Corollary 2 simply follows from the proof
for Theorem 4.
To illustrate Corollary 2, we present an example in Ap-
pendix C
V. ALGORITHMS AND CASE STUDIES
In this section, we provide the set-up information for
the case studies. Besides, based on the equilibrium analysis
and the optimal control analysis, an algorithm is proposed
to compute the optimal weight adaptation trajectory for the
system operator and the agents.
A. Preliminaries
In the simulation, the infection cost function fi(·) is given
to be linear in xi(t), i.e., fi(xi(t)) = αixi(t). Here, we set αi =
α,∀i∈N . The weight adaptation cost is taken to be quadratic
where gi j(ui j−w
o
i j) = (1/2)di j(ui j−w
o
i j)
2 for all i ∈ N , j ∈
N outi,o . Unless otherwise stated, let αi = 1,di j = d = 0.2 for all
i ∈N , j ∈N outi,o . Note that under this setting, assumptions 1
and 2 hold and gi j(·) is even and convex.
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PARAMETERS USED FOR NUMERICAL STUDY UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED.
Cost functions Network Topology Spreading
fi(xi) gi j(ui j−w
o
i j) αi di j N w
o
i j 〈k
out 〉 〈kin〉 βi σi T
αixi
1
2 di j(ui j−w
o
i j)
2 1 0.2 150 1 7.545 7.545 0.04 0.1 20
Algorithm 1 DVR
Input: xi0, i ∈N ; βi,σi, i ∈N ; fi(·),gi j(·), i ∈N , j ∈N
out
i,o ; W
o; ε .
Step 1: Each i ∈N selects ui(t) ∈Ui arbitrarily.
Step 2: Forward part: obtain xi(t) from xi0 and (9) for each i ∈N .
if solving social problem (16) then
Step 3: Backward part: obtain λ(t) from p˙i(t) = Γ(t)pi(t)+ γˆi(t) and
p(T ) = 0.
else
Step 3′: Backward part: Obtain pi(t), i ∈ N from p˙i(t) = Γ(t)pi(t)+
γi(t) and pi(T ) = 0.
end if
Step 4: Control update: Update control uˆi(t) based on (14).
Step 5: Control policy check:
if ‖uˆ−u‖∞ ≥ ε then
Set u= uˆ. Return to Step 2.
else
Set u∗i = uˆi. u
∗
i is the optimal weight adaptation scheme for agent i.
end if
The original network in the simulation is a bi-directional
scale-free network with 150 agents generated based on the
Baraba´si-Albert model [31], [32]. We select this model since
many kinds of computer networks, including the internet
and the web graph of the World Wide Web, have scale-
free properties. We generate the network by following the
growth and preferential attachment properties given in section
VII of [31]. For simplicity, the original weight is set to be
woi j = 1 for all edge (i, j). Let 〈k
in〉 〈kout〉 be the average in-
degree (out-degree) of the network we generated. We have
〈kin〉= 〈kout〉= 7.545.
For simplicity, we take same infection rates and curing rates
for all players. Unless otherwise stated, let βi = β = 0.04 and
σi = σ = 0.1. From the result in [34] and the fact that the
largest real part of the eigenvalues of matrix (W oB−D) is
0.5368, we say that the virus epidemic will outbreak in the
original network. The initial infection level is also set to be
the same for all players, xi0 = 0.16 for all i ∈N . Table I is a
summary of the setups.
B. Computational Algorithm
Note that we aim to propose an implementable distributed
virus resistance algorithm (DVR algorithm). Based on the
algorithm proposed in [33] for computation of open-loop NE
for nonzero-sum differential games, we present, in algorithm 1,
the DVR algorithm to compute the candidate open-loop NE
solutions for the differential game described by (7) and the
penalty-based differential game defined in Theorem 4. The
solution of the penalty-based differential game is inline with
the solution of the optimal control problem defined in (16).
Initially, the input data includes initial infection data: xi0 for
all i ∈ N ; infection rate βi, recovery rate σi for all i ∈ N ;
the original topology W o; the cost functions fi(·),gi j(·) for
all i ∈ N , j ∈ N outi,o and a stopping value ε to stop the
algorithm. In the first step, each player arbitrarily selects a
continuous control trajectory within the admissible control set
Ui for every out-link it has: ui j(t) for each i ∈ N , for all
j ∈ N outi,o , and reports the weight adaptation scheme ui(t) to
the network operator. In step 2, each player utilizes the initial
infection data xi0, i ∈ N and the control policy ui, i ∈ N ,
solve (9) forward in time to obtain xi, i ∈ N and report it
to the network operator. If the system aims to achieve the
social optimal control problem, then the algorithm goes into
step 3. Otherwise, the algorithm steps into step 3′. In step 3,
the system operator utilizes the reported ui and xi, i ∈N , the
infection damage cost fi(·), i ∈N to compute p(t) backward
based on (23) and sends pi(t) back to the corresponding player
i. In step 3′, the system operator utilizes the reported ui and
xi, i ∈ N , the infection damage cost fi(·), i ∈ N , computes
pi(t), i ∈ N backward based on (11) and sends pi(t) back
to the corresponding player i. In the next step, each player
updates its control based on (14) which only requires its
out-neighbors infection information and reports the updated
control policy to the network operator. Denote by uˆi(t) the
updated control policy. If ‖uˆ−u‖∞ ≥ ε , the algorithm moves
back to step 2. Otherwise, the latest updated policy uˆi is the
optimal control policy for agent i.
C. Numerical Results
In this subsection, we present the numerical results. First,
we show the dynamics of the costate function for all players.
Then, we show the evolution of the weight adaptation, the
infection and the costate of selected agents to see individuals’
behaviors. Second, we give the comparisons between the
optimal control based-weight adaptation scheme (this scheme
is equivalent to the penalized differential game based-weight
adaptation scheme) and the differential game-based weight
adaptation scheme. The optimal control based adaptation
scheme is from solving optimal control problem (16). The
two schemes together with the case of weight adaptation. are
compared in terms of the total cost and the infection level of
the whole network.
From (14) and φi j(t) := pii(t)(1− x
∗
i (t))β jx
∗
j(t), we know
that the weight adaptation of player i is based on its own
infection, its out-neighbors, and the costate component pii.
The infection of player i and its neighbors are just local
information. From (11) and (13), we can see the effect of the
whole network’s situation is conveyed by costate component
pii to the weight adaptation strategy of player i. Thus, we
investigate the dynamics of pii in Fig. 4, where the costate
component pii’s dynamics for all agents are plotted. As we
can see, pii(t) is positive for all i ∈ N during the whole
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Fig. 4. The dynamics of costate pii(t) for all players i ∈N .
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Fig. 5. The weight adaptation, the infection and the costate of agents 1, 50
and 150 over time. The first plot shows the weight adaptation of edge (1,150)
and edge (150,1) and the infection of agent 1 and 150. The second plot of Fig.
5 shows the costate dynamics of the two agents. The third gives the average
weight adaptation of agents 1, 50 and 100 where u¯i = ∑ j∈N outi,o
ui j/|N
out
i,o |.
time interval which corroborates Theorem 3. For most of the
players, the value of pii is high at the very beginning and then
decreases to 0. One interpretation is that players are more
sensitive at the beginning to their out-neighbors infection and
tend to cut their weights more heavily.
To see individual behaviors and states, we rank the agents
based on their out-degrees. Agent 1 has the largest out-degree.
From the first plot of Fig. 5, agent 1 is more likely to be
infected due to its large degree. We can see that all weights
equal 1 at and only at t = T = 20, which corroborates Theorem
3. The weight u150,1(t) is reduced to 0 for some time. This
phenomenon occurs because the costate and its out-neighbors’
infection levels are high during that time period. The third
plot shows that agents with higher out-degrees reduce less
weight. Usually, one suppose to cut more weights on highly
connected nodes to slow the infection propagation. However,
the obtained weight adaptation scheme in this paper is a result
of considering both the infection and the loss of efficiency of
the network agents. There is a trade-off between maintaining
the network’s performance and lowering the infection. So, the
agents with higher out-degrees may cut less weight to maintain
the performance/function.
To show that each agent has heterogeneous weight adapta-
tion to different neighbors, we present Fig. 6. We can know
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Fig. 6. The weight adaptation of links between fixed source agent and its
different neighbors. The weight adaptation of links connecting from agent 1
to its out-neighbors, agents 2, 83 and 150 is plotted in the first figure. In the
second figure, the weight adaptation of links connecting from agent 83 to its
out-neighbors, agents 1, 60 and 93. The infection level of all agents involved
is plotted in the last figure.
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Fig. 7. The total cost Jo versus different infection cost functions k under
the differential game-based weight adaptation scheme, optimal control based
weight adaption scheme and no weight adaptation scheme.
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Fig. 8. The dynamics of the whole network’s infection under differential
game-based weight adaptation scheme, optimal control based weight adaption
scheme, and no weight adaptation scheme.
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from Fig. 6 that agent 1 adapts weights with his/her out-
neighbors accordingly based on the evolution of the infection
levels of his/her out-neighbors. As we can see, agent 1 cuts
more weight on neighbors with higher infection levels. For
example, the infection level of agent 2 is higher than agent 150
all the time. Thus, weight u1,2 is lower than u1,150. Also, agent
83 reduces its weight on agent 1 to zero due to the latter’s high
infection level while its weight on agent 93 remains above 0.5.
Here, we compare the NE-based weight adaptation scheme,
the optimal control-based weight adaptation scheme, and no
weight adaptation scheme. In Fig. 7, we plot the total cost
Jo under the three schemes for different α . We observe that
no adaptation scheme cause the most total cost. For different
values of α , the NE-based scheme always incurs a higher cost
than the optimal control-based scheme, which indicates the
inefficiency of the NE solution. From the plot, we see that a
higher α causes more inefficiency.
Fig. 8 is presented to show the virus-resistance of the
proposed schemes. The black line shows the infection level
for the case with no adaptation scheme, the blue line shows
the case with the game-based scheme, and the green line shows
the case with the optimal control-based scheme. Even though
the game-based scheme is inefficient in terms of minimizing
the total cost, it outperforms the optimal control-based scheme
since the infection level under the game-based scheme is
always lower than the infection level under the optimal control
based scheme. No matter in what case, the scheme we have
proposed has proven to be virus-resistant and generated a
lower total cost than the scheme without adaptation did.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have established a differential game frame-
work to develop decentralized virus-resistant mechanisms over
complex networks. We have shown that weight adaptation
policies allow nodes to change weights to mitigate their
infection. The differential game approach has captured the
strategic and dynamic behaviors of a large number of self-
interested agents over time-varying networks. Each player
adapts its weight based on its own infection and its out-
neighbors infection. It has been observed that the higher levels
of its out-neighbors’ infection lead to lower weights. The effect
of non-local behaviors on the adaptation strategy has been
encoded in the costate function. We have discussed the ineffi-
ciency of the open-loop Nash equilibrium and have proposed
a penalty-based mechanism to achieve efficiency by imposing
local costs induced by reachable nodes. The differential game
framework has enabled the design and implementation of a
distributed algorithm over large-scale networks to control the
macroscopic behaviors of the virus spreading over networks.
Numerical examples have been used to illustrate the virus-
resistance of the proposed scheme and the inefficiency of the
Nash equilibrium. The differential game approach achieves a
better performance than its centralized counterpart in terms
of the mitigation of virus spreading. One future direction for
this work would be to study the steady behavior of long-term
virus-resistance scheme where the duration of virus spreading
is sufficiently long.
APPENDIX A
LEMMAS
Lemma 1. The dynamics equation G(x(t),W(t)) is uniformly
Lipschitz in x and wi for each i ∈N .
Proof. From (3), we have
‖G(x(t),W (t))−G(xˆ(t),W (t))‖∞
=‖(W (t)B−D)x(t)− (W(t)B−D)xˆ(t)
−Xd(t)W (t)Bx(t)+ Xˆd(t)W (t)Bxˆ(t)‖∞
≤‖(IN−Xd(t))W (t)B(x(t)− xˆ(t))‖∞
+ ‖D(x(t)− xˆ(t))‖∞ + ‖(Xd(t)− Xˆd(t))W (t)Bx(t)‖∞
≤2βM‖W (t)‖∞‖x(t)− xˆ(t))‖∞ + δM‖x(t)− xˆ(t))‖∞
≤max{2βM,δM}‖x(t)− xˆ(t))‖∞(1+ ‖W(t)‖∞),
(24)
where βM := maxiβi and δM := maxiδi, and IN :=
diag(1,1, · · · ,1). Since wi j is bounded by w¯i j, (1+ ‖W (t)‖∞)
is bounded. So, G is uniformly Lipschitz in x. The proof for
G is uniformly Lipschitz in wi for all i ∈N can be obtained
by following the similar steps.
Lemma 2. Let xi, i∈N be the corresponding solution to the
ODEs in (2). For all i ∈N , given 0< xi(0)≤ 1, xi(t) ∈ (0,1)
holds for all t ∈ (0,∞).
Proof. The proof follows Lemma 1 of [17]. It is clear that
xi(t) is a continuous function of time. When xi(0) = 1,
then from (2), we have x˙i(0) < 0, which means once xi(t)
reaches 1, it cannot stay there. On the other hand, when
xi(0) ∈ (0,1), the solution xi(t) would always lie in (0,1).
Otherwise, suppose that there exists t1 such that xi(t1) = 0 or
xi(t1) = 1. In the first case, note that x˙i(t)≥−σixi(t) holds for
the time interval (0, t1], which gives xi(t1)≥ xi(0)e
−σit1 > 0. It
yields a contradiction. In the second case where xi(t1) = 1,
we have xi(t) < 1 over time interval [0, t1). So, we have
x˙i(t
−
1 ) ≥ 0 which contradicts the fact obtained from (2) that
x˙i(t1)< 0.
APPENDIX B
PROOF
A. Proof of Observation 1
Proof. Given the original weight pattern W o, suppose that
woi j = 0, i.e., j /∈N
out
i,o and w
∗
i j(t)> 0. Obviously, player i can
lower his own cost by deviating wi j(t) from w
∗
i j(t) to 0, which
contradicts the fact that w∗i j(t) is the open-loop NE. A similar
statement can be made for the case when w∗i j > w
o
i j.
11
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Based on Theorem 6.11 in [23], conditions (9) and (10)
are directly derived. To obtain (11), we have
p˙ii(t) =−
∂Hi
∂xi
=− f ′i (x
∗
i (t))
+ pii

 ∑
j∈N outi,o
u∗i j(t)β jx
∗
j(t)+σi


− ∑
j∈N ini,o
pi j(t)(1− x
∗
j(t))u
∗
ji(t)βi,
p˙i j(t) =−
∂Hi
∂x j
= pi j

 ∑
k∈N outj,o
u∗jk(t)βkx
∗
k(t)+σ j


− ∑
k∈N inj,o
pik(t)(1− x
∗
k(t))u
∗
k jβ j.
(25)
Reformulating (25), we obtain condition (11). As the terminal
cost is unspecified and the final state is free, we have the
transversality condition pi(T ) = 0.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. By Assumption 2 and the fact that gi j, i, j ∈ N is
convex, we know that the Hamiltonian Hi is differentiable and
convex on ui j for every j. Also, the admissible control set is
convex. Thus, the solution of (10) can be obtained by letting
∂Hi(ui j)/∂ui j = 0, i.e.,
∂Hi(ui j(t))
∂ui j(t)
= g′i j(ui j(t)−ω
o
i j)+ pii(t)(1− xi(t))β jx j(t)
= g′i j(ui j(t)−ω
o
i j)+φii(t)
= 0.
Suppose ∂Hi(u˜i j(t))/∂ui j(t) = 0. If u˜i j(t) ∈ [0,ω
o
i j] which
happens if and only if g′i j(−w
o
i j) <−φi j(t)< g
′
i j(0), then ac-
cording to (10), u∗i j(t) = u˜i j(t) = (g
′
i j)
−1(−φi j(t)). Otherwise,
if u˜i j(t)< 0, u
∗
i j(t) = 0 while if u˜i j(t)>ω
o
i j, u
∗
i j(t) =ω
o
i j. Thus,
we have the optimal control rule in the form of (14).
D. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. For proof of (i), note the fact that if h(x) is a continuous
and piece-wise differential function over [a,b] such that h(a)=
h(b) while h(x) 6= h(a) for all x in (a,b), (dh/dx)(a+) and
(dh/dx)(b−) cannot be negative simultaneously. From (11),
we have pi(T ) = 0, which gives p˙ii(T
−) = limt→T− p˙ii(t) =
− f ′i (xi(T )) < 0. Hence, there exists εi > 0 such that pii > 0
and pi j ≥ 0 for j ∈N /{i} over [T − εi,T ]. Suppose that one
of the costate component pi j violates the inequality first at
ta < T , i.e., we have pi j(t)≥ 0 for t ≥ ta, we obtain p˙i j(t
+
a )≤ 0
which is not feasible. If it is pii that first violates the inequality
at time ta, we have p˙ii(t
+
a ) = − f
′
i (x
∗
i (t))−∑ j∈N ini,o
pi j(t)(1−
x∗j(t))u
∗
ji(t)βi < 0 which is in contradiction with the fact.
To prove (ii), note that at time T , we have pi(T ) = 0.
Combined with the fact that gi j(·) is convex and continuously
differentiable, gi j(0) = 0 and pii(t) > 0, by expression (14),
we have that u∗i j(t) = w
o
i j holds only at t = T .
For proof of (iii), from Observation 1, we know that if woji =
0, the optimal weight adaptation u∗ji(t) = 0 for every t. Here,
|N ini,o | = 0 indicates w
o
ji = 0 for all j ∈ N . Based on (11)
and (13), the dynamics of the costate component pii(t) can be
written as
p˙ii(t) =

 ∑
j∈N outi,o
u∗i j(t)β jx
∗
j(t)+σi

 pii(t)−αi.
Note that the first term in the bracket is non-negative and
pii(T ) = 0. Moving backward from T , it’s obvious that pii(t)
is bounded above by αi/σi.
Under conditions stated in (iv), the dynamics of the costate
component pii(t) can be written as
p˙ii(t) =−αi+ ∑
j∈N ini,o
−(1− x∗j(t))u
∗
ji(t)βipi j(t).
We have proved in (i) that pi j(t)≥ 0 holds for all i, j ∈N , i 6=
j and for t ∈ [0,T ] which indicates p˙ii < 0. Thus, pii(t) is
strictly monotonically decreasing over t.
E. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Assume that uo = (u
o
1, ...,u
o
n) is an open-loop optimal
control of the centralized control problem (16), and xo =
(xo1, ...,x
o
n) is the state path under the optimal control. Fix an
arbitrary i ∈N , and let ui 6= u
o
i be an open-loop strategy for
player i. Let x = (x1, ...,xn) be the new state trajectory given
by (16) corresponding to (ui,u
o
−i). As u
o and xo are optimal
for the optimal control problem (16), then
T∫
0
N
∑
i=1
fi(xi(t))+∑
j 6=i
∑
k∈N outj,o
g jk(u
o
jk(t)−w
o
jk)
+ ∑
k∈N outi,o
gik(uik(t)−w
o
ik)dt
≥
T∫
0
N
∑
i=1
fi(x
o
i (t))+
N
∑
i=1
∑
j∈N outi,o
gi j(u
o
i j(t)−w
o
i j)dt.
Adding to both sides of this this inequality the constant
−
T∫
0
∑
j 6=i
∑
k∈N outj,o
g jk(u
o
jk(t)−w
o
jk)dt,
we obtain that Jˆi(ui,u
o
−i) ≥ Jˆi(u
o) for all ui ∈Ui. According
to the definition of open-loop NE for differential games in (6),
we know uo is also an open-loop NE for the differential game
with penalties.
To show the optimal control problem (16) shares the same
necessary conditions with the new differential game, we again
utilize the maximum principle. The Hamiltonian of player i
for the new differential game is Hˆi = Hi+ ci(t). We can find
that relations (9) (10) and (11) under the Hamiltonian Hˆi are
aligned with relations (17) (18) and (19) where λ (t) = pi(t)
at each t for all i ∈N .
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APPENDIX C
EXAMPLE
To illustrate Corollary 2, we consider a directed network in
Fig. 3. Here, R1 = {1}, R3 = {1,2,3,4}, R5 = {1,4,5}. The
Γ(t) associated with this network can be rewritten as an upper
triangular block matrix. The upper triangular matrix is denoted
by ΓRi where the first |Ri| rows and columns of this matrix
represent the vertices in Ri in an ascending order. The last
N− |Ri| rows and columns represent the rest of the vertices
in N \Ri in an ascending order. For example, the permutation
for agent 5 is {1,4,5,2,3}. Thus, the dynamics of p5 under
the differential game given in Corollary 2 can be written as

p˙51
p˙54
p˙55
p˙52
p˙53

=
[
Γu
R5
03×2
Γl
R5
Γr
R5
]


p51
p54
p55
p52
p53

+


− f ′1(x1)
− f ′4(x4)
− f ′5(x5)
0
0

 ,
where
Γu
R5
=


∑
j∈{2,3}
u∗1 jβ jx
∗
j +σ1 0 0
−(1− x∗1)u
∗
14β4 ∑
j∈{3,5}
u∗4 jβ jx
∗
j +σ4 0
0 −(1− x∗4)u
∗
45β5 σ5

 ,
Γl
R5
=
[
−(1− x∗1)u
∗
12β2 0 0
−(1− x∗1)u
∗
13β3 −(1− x
∗
4)u
∗
43β3 0
]
,
ΓrR5 =
[
u∗23β3x
∗
3+σ2 0
−(1− x∗2)u
∗
23β3 σ3
]
.
Thus, if we let ci(t) = ∑ j∈Ri,o\{i} f j(x j), the dynamics of pii
described by (23) is consistent with the dynamics of the ith
component of λ described by (18). By solving the optimization
problem (19), we know that the optimal control problem
shares the same control rule (14) with the differential game
problem. Since pii(t) = λi(t) for every t ∈ [0,T ], we can see
the statement in Corollary 2 holds.
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